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Abstract
Economists included knowledge their models to improve their explanatory accuracy. A major step was to de-
scribe the production of knowledge as well as its exploitation as an internal part of economic models. Politicians 
prefer to talk about a new kind of economy so they can sustain the myth of progress. Rather than explain eco-
nomies using a new model they try to leave economic history intact while describing the future using the new 
and different model. Once the knowledge economy became a progressive new entity and embedded in political 
rhetoric at the highest level, institutions competing for resources have to adopt the vocabulary and redefine 
themselves as knowledge organisations. As more and more professions, firms and organisations described their 
activities in terms of the new knowledge economy, so performatively the knowledge economy became part of 
political reality. Knowledge is metaphysical. If it has any kind of existence then it is embodied and projected 
through the skills of the knowers. Since technology connects with all human activity, the reformulation of insti-
tutions and priorities demands changes to descriptions of what technology is. Knowledge is at one end of a spec-
trum. Whim is at the other end. It makes little difference to economic models what the algebraic terms are 
called. Talk of the knowledge economy is therefore simply a way of saying our cultures and therefore our tech-
nologies are dynamic.
Political Rhetoric
Politicians have heralded a new knowledge economy1. 
“Europe's leaders”, for example, have recently “set out 
a strategic vision” to turn “the European Union into a 
world-class  … knowledge  economy”2.  Previously,  in 
1997, US President Clinton in his State of the Union 
address highlighted the “education standards” needed 
for  success  in  “the  knowledge  economy of  the  21st 
century” which he linked with “the power of the In-
formation Age”3. Tony Blair, the British prime minis-
ter, at a conference in 1998, acknowledged, “we are en-
tering a knowledge economy”4 and, two years later he 
was able to report, “[t]he new knowledge economy is 
here, and it is now”5. On the same occasion the Por-
tuguese  prime  minister,  Antonio  Guterres,  declared 
“[t]he transition to an innovation and knowledge based 
society and economy is now under way.”6 Blair’s min-
isters, added a sense of urgency. Stephen Byers, Sec-
retary of State for Trade and Industry, announced that 
“[t]he  shift  from an  industrial  to  a  knowledge-based 
economy at the beginning of the 21st century is quite 
as profound as the move from an agricultural to an in-
dustrial economy at the beginning of the 19th century”7
,  and  his  successor,  Patricia  Hewitt,  clearly  saw the 
situation as one that demanded action from politicians 
when she said “The global knowledge economy con-
fronts  British  politics,  and  politicians,  with  … large 
challenges”8. In Canada, “the real Canadian story is”, 
announced Finance Minister Paul Martin, partly “about 
the  extent  to  which  [Canada  has]  embraced  …  the 
knowledge  economy”9.  For  Industry  Canada,  this 
knowledge-based economy has the “ability to generate 
and use knowledge [as] a determinant of wealth”10.
Politicians from many other countries, are involved, for 
instance  this  year,  “[h]igh-level  delegations  from 
Brazil,  China,  and India gathered on the outskirts  of 
London … to design preliminary strategies on how to 
help their countries succeed in the global knowledge 
economy of the 21st century.”11 In South Korea “a vis-
ion of … becoming a knowledge-based economy has 
now become a key objective of government policy”12. 
And a commentator reports that a “transformation … 
has quietly begun … of the Singapore economy into a 
knowledge  economy”13 which  is  compelling  “Singa-
pore's politicians … to grapple … with the power equa-
tion as the new knowledge economy redefines leader-
ship roles”14. In the wider Asia-Pacific region leaders 
have “underscored the importance of knowledge as a 
key  driver  of  future  economic  growth  and  develop-
ment”15.  The  knowledge  economy  has  therefore  be-
come a significant term in the rhetoric of political lead-
ers and they seem to agree that “[t]he society we live in 
has  been  gradually  turning  into  a  “knowledge 
society,””16 and  that  this  incorporates  a  new kind of 
economy.
Economic models
Kenneth  J.  Arrow was  an influential  economist  who 
wrote about knowledge as a component in models of 
economies. In particular, he incorporated in his theor-
ies terms representing the process of acquiring know-
ledge — learning. Learning he associated with doing, 
and knowledge with experience.  He regarded experi-
ence and knowledge as a stimulus to technical change 
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while simultaneously technical change is a cause of en-
vironmental  change  and  accordingly  an  agent  in  the 
production of new knowledge. He observed that since 
knowledge and technical change feed off one another, 
knowledge is not something that is static and asserted 
that “knowledge is growing with time” 17. 
Arrow’s aim was not to generate a model of a new kind 
of economy, but to make good some of the deficiencies 
in existing models. Paul Romer, who took up Arrow’s 
work used data series dating back over several centur-
ies to motivate the study of models that incorporated 
knowledge. For instance he looked at data for the Neth-
erlands, Britain and the US from 1700 until 1979, data 
about the US from 1800 to 1978 and statistics derived 
from data series  that  began no later  than  1870 from 
Britain,  France,  Denmark,  US,  Germany,  Sweden, 
Italy,  Australia,  Norway,  Japan  and  Canada.  Romer, 
therefore, was not referring to a new economy, but to 
an economic model that fitted historical data, similarly 
Arrow’s economic model was inspired by earlier ob-
servations, for instance, by empirical work from 193618 
that  revealed the cost  of  production diminished with 
experience. These economists did not, therefore, regard 
the knowledge economy as a new phenomenon.19
Knowledge
For those that construct economic models knowledge is 
simply a variable in the equations and can be aggreg-
ated so that “the state of knowledge”, as Romer puts it, 
can be “denoted by k”20. One of Arrow’s insights was 
that  by  making  knowledge  instrumental,  knowledge 
did not need an interpretation. Arrow merely noted that 
knowledge is “difficult to measure” 21. There is no need 
for elaboration, however economists seeking a connec-
tion between their knowledge variable and the use of 
the word ‘knowledge’ might  see it, in their jargon, as 
“the basic form of capital”22 or an “intangible capital 
good”.23 This intangibility though turns knowledge into 
an enigma.
It  seems knowledge  “flows”24,25,  forms  a  “current”26, 
enters through “channels”27 or “a conduit”28; a “stock 
of knowledge”29 can be held in “stores”30 thus there are 
“repositories  of  knowledge”.  Knowledge  can  be 
“tapped”31, “excavated”32or perhaps “mined [from] the 
richest veins of ideas”33 or extracted from “low grade 
ore”34 using “tools of knowledge extraction”35. It can 
be put in “harness”36, “filtered”37, suffer “absorption”38, 
or “diffusion”39.  It has a “volume”40 that can be con-
tained in a “pool”41 or a “reservoir”42. This torrent of 
metaphors  makes it  evident  that  it  is  difficult  to  pin 
down knowledge. 
For  philosophers,  the  topic  of  knowledge  has  been 
problematic, particularly when it was linked with the 
troublesome notion of  truth43.  Wittgenstein offered  a 
clue to an alternative when he wrote “The grammar of 
the word “knows” is evidently closely related to that of 
“can”,  “is  able  to””44.  Helpfully,  he  added  in  paren-
theses “(‘Mastery’ of a technique,)”45.
From a behavioural point of view, what causes us to 
say  that  people  have  knowledge  is  something  about 
their performance. Knowledgeable people have a skill 
and  a  skill  is  a  practice  executed  well.  Knowledge, 
then, is a word that is instrumental in explanations of 
practices and does not have to correspond with any dis-
tinctive mental object. But to say someone has know-
ledge requires a judgement, which is inevitably cultur-
ally specific.
Distinction
There have been attempts to categorise knowledge in 
various  ways46,47.  A  common  distinction  is  made 
between knowledge that is embodied1 — dubbed tacit 
knowledge  — and signs of  knowledge  imprinted  in 
artefacts  that  can be transferred and copied — often 
termed codified knowledge. Tacit knowledge is said to 
be “codifiable if it can be written down and transferred 
easily to others”48. 
Authors go to some lengths to uphold the differences. 
Tacit  knowledge  or  “human  capital”49 is  said  to  be 
“slow to acquire and much more difficult to transfer”50, 
“more internal and experiential”51, “subconsciously un-
derstood and applied, difficult to articulate, developed 
from  direct  experience  and  action”52,  “held  in  the 
mind/brain”53,  “inside the heads of people”54,  unshar-
able55 and “highly personal”56.
Codified knowledge, or explicit knowledge is said to 
be “expressed in words and numbers … easily commu-
nicated and shared in the form of hard data, scientific 
formulae, codified procedures or universal principles”57
, “an abstract mathematical formula derived from phys-
ical experiments or a training manual describing how 
to close a sale”58, “knowledge that can be codified into 
written  rules,  facts  and  instructions”59,  “procedure 
manuals,  product  literature,  or  computer  software”60, 
sharable61.  Explicit  knowledge is  treated as though it 
were a material sign of knowledge.
The distinction is attractive to economists because co-
dified knowledge, linked to artefacts, can be regarded 
as capital and tacit knowledge as a component of la-
bour.
Sharing
A crucial consideration for Arrow was that “[l]earning 
is  the product  of  experience”62.  Romer however pre-
sumed that somehow the results of experience could be 
easily transferred from one person to another. The ef-
fort involved in creating a new design, Romer assumed 
was made easier by the availability of (rather than ex-
perience  of)  previous  designs.  He  thought  that  once 
1
 I perhaps need to add embodied in people. Embodied 
is sometimes used to refer to artefacts.
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someone had created a design, “other inventors” could 
“spend  time  studying  the  patent  application  …  and 
learn  knowledge  that  helps  in  the  design”63 of  new 
goods.
It is commonly supposed that knowledge can be trans-
ferred or shared, that “technology has made the transfer 
of knowledge easier and cheaper” 64 and that it is the 
role of “knowledge management” to ensure knowledge 
is “acquired and well shared within firms”65. It is first 
anticipated that “we can translate partial and implicit 
knowledge  … into  organized  explicit  knowledge.”66; 
secondly it is assumed that “once … knowledge is cod-
ified,  it  can be spread easily and cheaply”67 and that 
“knowledge can be freely transported”68. 
From  a  behavioural  point  of  view,  the  outcome  of 
learning is the ability to display a skill (such as passing 
examinations)  recognised by an authority.  A student, 
who the authority judges, can convincingly imitate an 
authorised teacher would be said to have gained know-
ledge.
Artefacts that help learners create the illusion that they 
contain knowledge. Particular  kinds of  artefacts,  like 
textbooks, provide evidence of an author’s skill and, it 
is  commonly  inferred,  knowledge.  Exposure  to  such 
artefacts can guide students in their attempts to mimic 
the habits of the author, and because the textbook can 
help  the  student  compare  the  product  of  their  skills 
with those of an absent author, the textbook is some-
times assumed to contain or carry the author’s know-
ledge.  But  books  do  not  have  the  skills  that  people 
have, so they cannot be said to be knowledgeable, nd 
students cannot be said to have the same skills as the 
author but merely that they can generate similar results.
The transfer of knowledge through artefacts is there-
fore an illusion. An artefact, such as a book, is, at best, 
a sign of knowledge rather than a carrier. The reaction 
to such signs is culturally and contextually specific. In 
suitable  circumstances,  however  artefacts  like  books 
incorporated into a customary educational practice can 
guide students in their attempts to mimic the practices 
of authors and teachers.
Intrinsic Knowledge
Skilled practices involve groups of people in environ-
ments  that  inevitably include  artefacts.  Artefacts  can 
spawn new practices and, occasionally, the new prac-
tice has an outcome that is analogous to an outcome of 
an established practice. A new combination of artefacts 
and practices can then act as a substitute for a tradition.
People find some skills more demanding than others, 
and when a new, surrogate practice is less burdensome 
than the customary practice then the differences might 
be attributed to the change in the repertoire of artefacts. 
The required skills are diminished when artefacts are 
introduced, thus artefacts appear to substitute for frag-
ments of skill, and knowledge, no longer needed by the 
practitioners, appears to be transferred to the artefacts. 
A calculator, for instance appears to acquire knowledge 
of addition, or a videodisk of Hamlet, the skill of act-
ing. 
Two  similar  illusions  arise  the  first  because  some 
goods facilitate learning, and the second because some 
undemanding practices involving artefacts can replace 
expert  practices.  Both of  these illusions give the im-
pression that knowledge is intrinsic to material goods.
People  are  deceived  into  believing  that  measures  of 
material goods also quantify the knowledge they sup-
posedly contain. Policy makers then become anxious if 
their community cannot generate signs of knowledge in 
sufficient  quantities.  For  example,  a  government 
agency is concerned when the country “only produces 
2.7 per cent of the world’s scientific papers”69.
The Myth
Berkeley, the eighteenth century philosopher appeared 
to concur with the view that words and signs contain 
knowledge.  “[W]ords”,  he  wrote,  “are  of  excellent 
use”. “By their means”, he continued, “all that stock of 
knowledge which has been purchased by the joint la-
bours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be 
drawn into the view and made the possession of one 
single  person”.  Unfortunately,  however,  he  added, 
“most  parts  of  knowledge  have  been  strangely  per-
plexed and darkened by the abuse of words”70.
First there is the difficulty of codifying knowledge. Di-
derot, in an account of his work of collecting data for 
the Encyclopédie, complained, 
“Most of those who practise the mechanical arts 
… operate merely by instinct.  Among a thou-
sand one will be lucky to find a dozen who are 
capable  of  explaining  the  tools  or  machinery 
they use, and the things they produce, with any 
clarity”71.
Worse  still,  some  machinery  defies  description.  Di-
derot explains, 
“[T]here are machines so hard to describe and 
skills so elusive that, short of trying the work 
oneself  and operating  the machine  with one’s 
own hands and seeing the product  with one’s 
own eyes, they are difficult to describe with any 
accuracy.”72
Even if the difficulty of creating an intelligible formal-
ism has been overcome, the interpretation of the record 
is not necessarily reliable. In a play by Arthur Miller, a 
character  Chris  asks,  “The  court  record  was  good 
enough for you all these years, why isn’t it good now?” 
and in reply George says 
“But today I heard it from his mouth. From his 
mouth it’s altogether different than the record. 
Anyone who knows him … will believe it from 
his mouth”73. 
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In an industrial context, once a record is made and read 
it does not necessarily allow a reader to reconstitute the 
skills  of  using or  building machinery that  were  sup-
posedly recorded. In some cases, Diderot reports, that 
the only way the writers could find out about certain 
operations was to learn to do it themselves by operat-
ing the machines and making some products. He ob-
served, “in the studio it is the moment that speaks”74 
and concluded that “it is not through books that we can 
learn  how  to  manipulate  tools  and  machines”.75 As 
Landes colourfully puts it, “It takes more than recipes, 
blueprints, and even personal testimony to learn indus-
trial cuisine”76. 
Basalla, who wrote about the evolution of technology 
offered an example. He explained that when a textile 
business was to be set up in the US “[h]aving the actual 
machines  did  not  suffice”77 since  “all  of  technology 
can never be translated into words, pictures, or math-
ematical equations” so “the practitioner with hands on 
knowledge … will always have a role to play in the 
dissemination  of  technical  innovations”78.  He  con-
cluded
 “Although much of modern technology can be 
gleaned  from  the  pages  of  books,  articles, 
monographs, and patents, the artifacts must be 
studied at first hand, oral information gathered 
from the persons conversant with the new tech-
nology, and the innovations adapted to the re-
cipient economy and culture.”79
Even so
“all of the relevant information needed to build 
an intricate machine could not and, indeed, still 
cannot  be  conveyed  in  pictorial  form.  This 
holds  for  seventeenth-century  engravings  as 
well as for the best modern engineering draw-
ings. ”80
More recently, engineers “could not have launched the 
transistor  industry in Japan had they stayed at  home 
and relied solely upon the printed page for their know-
ledge” 81.  Basala explains,  “[t]heir understanding was 
gained not only by reviewing the printed technical in-
formation  but  also  by  observing  … and  questioning 
specialists who were immersed in semiconductor tech-
nology”82
Often  skilled  people,  in  addition  to  instructive  arte-
facts, are needed to provide lessons for local workers. 
“Successful  transfer  of  textile  technology  was  not 
achieved”, in the example offered by Basala, “until ex-
perience British emigrant artisans were able to put their 
nonverbal knowledge to use and produce machines for 
the  American  manufacturers” 83.  And  in  expanding 
manufacture of field guns in America, the French even-
tually had to send “a team of workmen” to demonstrate 
how to “get pieces of comparable firepower and stabil-
ity” to those manufactured in France84.
In spite of the availability of machinery and industrial 
recipes, manufacturers have often preferred to establish 
new production facilities by relocating skilled people. 
At one time “[t]he French imported Germans with me-
tallurgical skills; the Russians brought in Dutch, Ger-
mans,  and  Swedes”85 and  “in  1718–1720  …  France 
launched a systematic pursuit of British technicians”86 
although “the … British passed a law prohibiting the 
emigration  of  certain  skilled  craftsmen”87.  More  re-
cently, “the confiscation of German industrial patents 
…  did  not  …  benefit  competitors  ….  The  biggest 
American firms, with the best American chemical en-
gineers, did not know … how to make them work. So 
… they hired away German chemists”88. These are ap-
proaches that continue today where “[s]ome develop-
ing countries have experienced large inflows of skilled 
immigrants, [and] … [o]ther countries have imported 
technical knowledge embodied in the human capital of 
hired foreign experts”89.
Formalisation does not provide a universally easy route 
to those who wish to be credited with having a frag-
ment of knowledge. But, Landes claims, “formal edu-
cation  for  the  diffusion  of  technical  and  scientific 
knowledge  had  momentous  consequences”90 and  he 
suggests this was partly because “it almost always en-
tailed instruction in abstract and theoretical matters that 
lent themselves to a variety of applications”91. Abstrac-
tions and theories are signs which can be easily repro-
duced  which  perhaps  had  little  direct  effect  on  the 
practical  skills  of  the  engineers.  More  significantly 
they encouraged the  industrialisation of  education.  It 
allowed larger numbers to be educated in specialised 
educational institutions. The formalisms forced them to 
rehearse a similar vocabulary and they became skilled 
in  the  same academic  practices.  What  the  formalism 
did was to create solidarity between generations of stu-
dents. It homogenised engineering culture and created 
an influential internationalised profession.
Often signs of knowledge can be easily reproduced but 
it is a mistake to extrapolate and suggest that therefore 
practitioners can effortlessly acquire skills.
Assumptions
Romer treated the explicit knowledge that appears to 
be embedded in products as a special kind of capital. In 
particular he assumed that once codified, in products, 
designs  or  patents  knowledge  could  and  would  be 
shared.  This  allowed him to  create  new models  and 
then draw novel conclusions that fitted experience of 
economies  rather  better  than  earlier  models.  But  to 
make his models tractable Romer had to make a num-
ber of assumptions. First he took “the defining charac-
teristic  of  technology” to be that  “[o]nce the cost  of 
creating a new set of instructions has been incurred, the 
instructions can be used over and over again at no addi-
tional cost”92. A dubious assumption in view of the ap-
parent difficulty in transferring skills and knowledge.
To keep the analysis simple, the economists’ models 
have also tended to emphasise only the skill and hence 
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the  knowledge  involved  in  the  production  of  capital 
goods.  They  have  ignored  other  social  activities  and 
consequently adopt a peculiar view of knowledge and 
indeed a society. Their preoccupation is with skills that 
have a productive value in industry. This view of an 
economy aims to demonstrate a continual accumulation 
of industrial knowledge in unison with improvements 
in production.
But,  consumers  too  have  skills.  Produce,  even  a 
humble  potato,  requires  skill  in  its  use.  Consumers 
have social skills that help them select acceptable uses 
for  produce,  manual skills  for manipulating and pro-
cessing  produce  and  cerebral  skills  for  co-ordinating 
their actions and foretelling consequences. Consumers 
too will modify their practices in the light of their accu-
mulated experience — the experience of living. Know-
ledge, then, can also be attributed to the consumers.
The industrialists can only be integrated into an eco-
nomy if some of their goods find a place in a culture 
beyond  industrial  production.  By  accident  they  may 
find their goods in demand however the continued con-
sumption  of  their  goods  is  not  solely  dependent  on 
their skill in production, but also on the wider cultural 
acceptability of what they produce and hence the skills 
and knowledge of others.
Repercussions
One commentator  writes “Pundits  and politicians  are 
forever proclaiming that we live in a knowledge eco-
nomy”93, another that “Today's economy is driven by 
knowledge”94 and a report from an international agency 
announces that “a modern economy is in large part a 
knowledge-based  economy”95.  Assimilation  into  the 
knowledge economy is seen as a political priority.  A 
prime minister claims “the knowledge economy is our 
best route for success and prosperity”96 and confirma-
tion comes from an inter-governmetal  agency, which 
announced  “Knowledge  is  becoming  an  increasingly 
important  stimulant  of  economic  growth”97.  The 
rhetoric stresses the “the rising importance and poten-
tial  of  knowledge  in  economic  development”98.  Ac-
cording to an observer “The old foundations of success 
are  gone…  Suddenly  the  answer  is  "knowledge””99. 
Apparently “knowledge is the most strategic resource 
of the firm”100.
With such a powerful link being made between know-
ledge and success, astute politicians are bound to refor-
mulate  their  descriptions  of  political  activities  and 
goals. Even fears take on a new form. Bill Clinton re-
cognised “an unholy axis of new threats: terrorists, in-
ternational criminals and drug traffickers”. He worried 
that “[t]hese 21st century predators feed on technology 
and the free flow of information, ideas and people.”101. 
Industrialists  too  will  adjust  priorities  to  match  the 
newly emphasised threats such as the fear that “[w]hen 
staff  leave the firm  they  take their  knowledge with 
them”102 and  new  questions  about  control  are  raised 
when tacit knowledge is thought to be “the source of a 
firm’s competitive edge … [which] is much more diffi-
cult to monitor than machines or manual labour”103. 
Institutions
Enthusiasm for the rhetoric of the knowledge economy 
has led to the conclusion that “organizations processing 
knowledge are more significant … than organizations 
processing commodities”104. Institutions that can claim 
to  support  the  generation,  processing  or  transport  of 
knowledge might, therefore, gain political leverage. 
Universities,  for  instance,  might  maintain  that  their 
roles include “producing new knowledge and adapting 
knowledge  produced  elsewhere”105;  administrations 
might suggest that governments “serve as a conduit for 
new knowledge”106 and that “[g]overnment is a major 
player in the knowledge driven economy.”107; and cer-
tain public institutions gain political weight when it is 
declared  that  “the  “knowledge  infrastructure”  … in-
cludes … the education system and the public library 
networks”108.
Education gains influence when it is widely assumed 
that  “[c]ritical  to  the  success  of  a  knowledge-based 
economy is  a  strong education system”109 and that  a 
“successful  knowledge-based  economy requires  large 
public investments in education”110 Evidence of politic-
al  support  for  education  appears  in  a  government 
pamphlet  that  first  asserts “London has the most de-
veloped knowledge base in Europe”, and continues, “A 
key element of this knowledge base is undoubtedly the 
region’s education and training institutions” 111.
Investment in research institutions secure priority with 
the assertion that “[p]art of the drive towards embrac-
ing the knowledge driven economy must be to acceler-
ate  the  pace  of  development  in  science  and 
technology”112 especially when it is also reported that 
“economists agree that  creation of new technological 
knowledge  through  research  is  our  most  direct  eco-
nomic avenue for acquiring added value”113. Outlays in 
“time and money in research and development”114 are 
warranted by claims that “[b]asic research … advances 
knowledge”115 and  that  “to  succeed  in  the  emerging 
global knowledge economy it is essential to have the 
capability  to  perform  cutting-edge  research” 116.  In 
more colourful  terms it  is  declared,  “A nation’s  sci-
ence, engineering and technology (SET) base … is the 
engine-room that  powers  and  ultimately  underpins  a 
nation’s position in the knowledge economy”117.
The  availability  of  political  credit  causes  some eco-
nomic  sectors  reframe  their  activities:  for  instance, 
medicine  is  politically  resituated  by  the  claim  that 
“We're seeing a shift to more of a knowledge economy, 
particularly  in  health  care”118;  newspapers  are  pro-
moted as “one of the cheapest ways to communicate 
knowledge”119; and “professional services” are reposi-
tioned  as  organizations  that  “rely  heavily  on  knowl-
edge”120.
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Industries such as  “agriculture, mining, ceramics, tex-
tiles,  and  electronics”  are  realigned  to  become 
“strongly knowledge-based” and on occasions “some 
traditional or indigenous wisdom or cultural assets”121 
are considered to be knowledge based industries.
The  institution  of  work  itself  gains  support  when 
knowledge is  seen as “a side effect  of  work”122, and 
locations, such as Silicon Valley can gain authority, if 
it  is  “knowledge …that gives … the cutting edge in 
everything that it does”123. Branches of manufacturing 
are absorbed into the knowledge economy by the asser-
tion that they are “knowledge intensive” including “in-
formation  and  communications,  aerospace,  environ-
ment,  bioengineering,  and  mechatronics”124.  Vehicle 
manufacturing  is  resituated  by  the  disclosure  that 
“about 70 per cent of the production cost of a new car 
can be attributed to knowledge-based elements such as 
styling, design and software”125. Supporters of the New 
Zealand economy point out that their country has “ex-
cellent examples of knowledge-rich enterprises, partic-
ularly in electronics, software, biotechnology, banking, 
fashion design, filmmaking, education and some agri-
cultural products”126 and that “agriculture will be at the 
heart of any knowledge economy for New Zealand”127
Failure  to  become  labelled  as  a  component  of  the 
knowledge economy confers political weakness. Indus-
tries would be wary of being associated with the old 
economy after the announcement that “in the context of 
the knowledge economy … Australia is too heavily re-
liant on its traditional ‘old economy’ industries”128.
Professions
Members  of  professions  seek  enhanced  status  by 
claiming they are knowledge workers. The ILO lends 
legitimacy to claims that managers and senior govern-
ment officials, professional workers, and associate pro-
fessionals are knowledge workers.129 For some people 
“[k]nowledge  workers  are  defined  as:  [p]rofessionals 
with specialized skills and information; [e]ngineering, 
scientific, and technical workers; [d]ecision makers at 
the top level of management”130.  There is a tendency 
therefore to emphasise existing rankings of profession-
als. 
Some  see  entrepreneurs  as  the  “key  players”  in  a 
knowledge economy131, but according to Peter Drucker, 
in  the knowledge revolution “the key to maintaining 
leadership  …  is  likely  to  be  the  social  position  of 
knowledge professionals and social acceptance of their 
values”132 . Consequently,  new  positions  are  created 
such  as  the  “Chief  Knowledge  Officer”133 and  the 
“knowledge manager”.134 There are claims that knowl-
edge workers do particular kinds of jobs which involve 
manipulating “symbols rather than machines” and this, 
apparently,  includes  “architects  and  bank  workers, 
fashion  designers  and  pharmaceutical  researchers, 
teachers  and policy  analysts”135. In  the  field  of  food 
preparation  too  it  is  argued  that  there  is  a  growing 
“knowledge component, for example the skills of the 
chef and the atmosphere, or brand name, of the restau-
rant”136.
Definitions  of  knowledge  workers  can  also  exclude 
certain  occupations  and  an  anonymous  writer  com-
plains when the OECD definition embraces “hospital 
cleaners … as knowledge workers”137. 
Technology
Some specific industries use the rhetoric of the know-
ledge economy to their advantage. The computing and 
communications technologies,  for  instance,  are trans-
formed into “the facilitators of knowledge creation in 
innovative societies”138,  “central … to knowledge ac-
quisition and diffusion”139 and likely to be in an “en-
abling role” in an ideal knowledge based economy140. 
“[T]echnologies,  from e-mail  to cellular telephony to 
teleconferencing” gain repute because they “let  more 
and more people share knowledge”141. “The opportunit-
ies”,  it  seems,  “are great  for  developing countries  to 
take advantage of the new information and communic-
ations technologies in disseminating knowledge”142.
The claim that “[d]igital technology is the nerve system 
of the knowledge driven economy”143, gives credence 
to the assertion that  “[d]igital  technologies are a key 
enabler of a  modern, knowledge driven economy”144. 
The Internet acquires status when, it is announced that, 
“[i]n the US, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Finland,  and  Ireland,  the  growth  of  the  Internet  and 
other related new technologies have become the cata-
lyst for the creation of ‘knowledge economies’.”145 
Talk of technology becomes dominated by “the new in-
formation and communication technologies” which are 
thought to “hold great potential for broadly disseminat-
ing knowledge at low cost, and for reducing knowledge 
gaps”146 and  by  “research  technology  that  produces 
knowledge” 147
The economists though in an attempt to simplify their 
models have tended to locate knowledge creation in the 
research arena and knowledge use in the construction 
of  production systems.  Arrow,  for  instance,  assumed 
“new capital  goods incorporate all the knowledge … 
available”148. He did not allow for improvements made 
by  the  production  workers,  users  or  consumers  of 
goods.  This  standpoint  was taken up by Romer who 
saw  “new  knowledge  …  translated  into  goods  with 
practical value”149 and “technological change” as “im-
provement  in  the  instructions  for  mixing  raw 
materials” 150. He treated research as a special kind of 
production system in which “human capital and the ex-
isting stock  of  knowledge”  is  used  “to produce  new 
knowledge” which form “new designs”. Knowledge is 
created  through  the  application  of  technology  to  re-
search and creates “a maximum technologically feas-
ible rate of growth for knowledge”151. The transmission 
of knowledge from a new design takes place, according 
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to Romer, because it increases the stock of knowledge 
available to the research sector. 
Culture
Arrow thought it obvious that “knowledge is growing 
in time” so that “[t]he stock of knowledge”, as Romer 
asserted, “goes on growing”152 and “will grow without 
bound”153. Other authors too see knowledge as bound-
less  and  assume  “[t]he  new  knowledge  economy  is 
based on … an infinite resource”154. There is a rhetoric 
of  growth.  President  Clinton  reported,  “[t]he  entire 
store  of  human  knowledge  now  doubles  every  five 
years” 155.  Another  suggestion  is  that  “[t]hirty  years 
ago,  knowledge  doubled  every  fourteen  years—it  is 
now doubling every seven years”156 and it is anticipated 
there will be “an acceleration in the growth of the stock 
of codified scientific and technological knowledge”157. 
Romer also wrote that “Knowledge does not depreci-
ate” 158.   The implication is that the knowledge attrib-
uted to artefacts including publications increases. Ac-
cording  to  these  assumptions  the  designer  of  new 
products  can  “take  advantage  of  all  the  additional 
knowledge  accumulated  …  during  the  last  100 
years”159.
A casual glance at Diderot’s eighteenth century encyc-
lopaedia reveals that printed descriptions, artefacts and 
practices can become obsolete, so not everyone agrees 
that  useful  knowledge  expands.  Some  warn  that 
“knowledge  and  expertise  that  can  be  shared  often 
quickly  becomes  obsolete”160 and  although  “[k]now-
ledge is  an infinitely  expandable,  intangible asset” it 
has “a relatively short productive lifetime”161. “Most of 
our knowledge”, it is surmised, “is transitory”162. Au-
thors speculate on the cause; one suggests “new know-
ledge  makes  old  skills  obsolete”163 and  another  that 
“technological  advances … speed the depreciation of 
human  capital”164.  Thus  new knowledge  overwhelms 
old knowledge.
What  can  easily  expand  are  stocks  of  the  signs  of 
knowledge. If knowledge is embodied then it is the hu-
man capacity to practice skills that imposes a bound. 
Unread  books  do  not  constitute  knowledge.  More 
knowledge would seem to imply a wider variety of hu-
man pratices however information and transport tech-
nologies are homogenising experience and practices.
Quantification  of  knowledge  is  a  dubious  art  and 
whether or not knowledge is growing is part of a fruit-
less debate. However talk of the growth of knowledge 
is a symptom of changing cultural practices. Physical, 
chemical,  biological,  technological  and  social  pro-
cesses  change what are considered to be satisfactory 
practices. They alter what is to be known, make exist-
ing embodied knowledge obsolete and increase uncer-
tainty.  Offensive  warfare,  for  instance,  accelerates 
these entropic processes.
Many accounts  of  the  knowledge economy privilege 
knowledge generated by professional researchers  and 
used in creating capital goods employed in industrial 
processes. Some completely ignore the knowledge at-
tributable to other social activities. But by failing to ac-
credit other social activities they miss out swathes of 
human  activity  from  their  models.  Recognising  that 
everyone is  engaged in social practices and therefore 
everyone can be said to be knowledgeable would create 
a different interpretation of the knowledge economy.
Denying  that  someone’s  practices  are  informed  by 
knowledge suggests their actions are founded in opin-
ion or whim but this is just a relabelling of invisible 
magical  causes.  The economic  models  work  just  the 
same if the variables are labelled whim or opinion in-
stead of knowledge.
If  we cease to  worry about unquantifiable  growth in 
knowledge and assume that what happens is our prac-
tices change in response to whim, opinion and know-
ledge  and  simultaneously  our  practices  change  our 
whims, opinions and knowledge. Fashion becomes as 
significant as knowing and to say we have a knowledge 
economy is simply to say we have a dynamic culture.
Conclusion
The  knowledge  economy  is  grounded  in  a  mythical 
commodity.
The myth is promoted by the rhetoric that tells us we 
have moved to a new kind of economy, a knowledge 
economy, where technology has speeded the flow of 
knowledge.  Politicians  have  accepted  the  myth  and 
through their turns of phras have changed how roles 
and  institutions  are  described  and  valued.  It  has 
changed,  for  instance,  our  view  of  technology. 
Technology has gained some esteem. Technology is no 
longer  primarily  about  polluting  factories  but 
principally about exploiting, processing and conveying 
information.
The  ‘knowledge  economy’  is  a  phrase,  a  rhetorical 
device  that  is  performative.  We  have  a  knowledge 
economy because we choose to  talk  and write  about 
our activities with reference to the phrase. That is the 
political fashion.
The knowledge economy is therefore a rhetorical term 
that  currently  confers  privilege.  It  has  privileged  the 
information technology industries, research institutions 
and  universities  in  particular.  In  the  name  of  the 
knowledge  economy  emphasis  has  been  placed  on 
establishing  an  international  culture  and  if  a  claim 
could  ever  be  mounted  about  the  relative  scale  of 
embodied  and  hence  usable  knowledge,  then  the 
homogenisation of cultures probably has reduced what 
is available. More knowledge should lead to a greater 
variety  of  practices.  What  we  see  in  the  increasing 
levels  of  telecommunication  is  a  homogenisation  of 
culture, that is the same culture involving more people. 
This does not imply more knowledge but less. 
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